One of the myths of ‘development’ that has gained great currency in the last two decades is that of ‘development’ as primarily an expansion in the total production and consumption capacity of a given economy. Thus, the relentless neo-liberal emphasis on ‘growth’. In the Brahmaputra valley, in an utter match of irony, the expansion in the total production and consumption capacity of the economy was also the argument vis-à-vis the colonial promotion of migration of peasants from the floodplains of the then eastern Bengal into the Brahmaputra valley. Therefore, today, the valley stands out as a case study of what the logic of ‘growth’ can possibly lead to – ‘development’ or a political economy wrecked in systemic relations of violence, that however ensures a certain pattern of accumulation of wealth and commercial capital, and in turn once again perpetuates the system.

One of the pervasive arguments in the capitalist West against migration was/is the erosion in the availability of employment for the ‘local’ people (‘the migrants take away our jobs’.) and cultural difference. But in the Brahmaputra valley, there is little evidence to suggest the erosion in the availability of employment for the ‘local’ or the indigenous peoples. The migration from the floodplains of eastern Bengal, on the contrary, led to the erosion in the availability of land. In the context of the finite space of the valley (with an average width of 80 kilometers only, and through which also flows the massive Brahmaputra, one of the largest river systems in the world), the shrinking availability of land was to have significant repercussions, the tremors of which are still being felt and would certainly continue to be felt as well.

This brings one to the central question of the explosive relation between migration, development and politics in the valley. In this regard, since the late 19th and the 20th centuries, it is possible to delineate four sets of transformations that the valley has experienced. The problematic of migration was a part of this very process. (a) Firstly, large tracts of land were put out of bounds for the common (indigenous) people by the colonial government in terms of ‘forests’ and tea plantations (in the eastern part of the valley).1 Studies today increasingly highlight that the contention that tea plantations came up in ‘wastelands’ was a colonial myth (which colonial archives continue to perpetuate). Further, the rigid distinction between ‘forest’ and agrarian land or land for habitat was also a colonial invention of the period.2 (b) Secondly, colonialism for the first time introduced and practiced the concept of ethnic space, a specific relation between people and space, in the valley. It was markedly different from the pre-colonial organization of society in two ways, viz. (i) the pre-colonial organization of society in the valley was semi caste semi tribe in nature3, and (ii) the focus of governance and economic organization was people and not space, most effectively carried out especially in the central and eastern part of the valley through the paik system.4 The cumulative change that colonialism brought about in this regard is that it sought to anthropologically define categories of ‘people’ (wherein lies its distinction from the pre-colonial semi caste semi tribe social organization) and designate them in a typology of space, whether socio-economically, culturally or politically. Thus, for example, emerged categories like ‘tribe’ and ‘peasant’, each practicing a different kind of land use in the colonial discourse. But because in the valley, and unlike in the neighbouring hills, it was wet rice cultivation that was carried out, therefore, the concept of different land use between ‘tribe’ and ‘peasant’ remained inapplicable. It is important to note here that though in terms of land use and taxation policy, the difference between the categories of ‘tribe’ and ‘peasant’ was subsumed in ‘peasant’, with regard to administrative or cultural demarcation of space and people, the distinction was retained.5 It would, thereby, be evident from the preceding discussion that colonialism introduced and practiced the concept of ethnic space, but ethnic space as a problematic.6

(c) Thirdly, in this background of squeezing out of land from the finite space of the narrow valley in terms of ‘forest’ and tea plantations and the introduction of the concept of ethnic space since the late 19th century, colonialism also introduced a new form of migration into the valley, viz. migration of peasants from the floodplains of eastern Bengal. Though the valley had been historically a focal point of migration, especially from present day Myanmar and beyond in South East Asia even in the pre-colonial period, the nature and impact of the migration was different from that of peasants from eastern Bengal since the 19th century. Four major differences in this regard may be noted. Firstly, the difference in the nature of the concept of state and political space between the colonial and pre-colonial state systems played a major role in the nature of accommodation or indigenization of migrants in the valley. Secondly, anti-colonial agitations and nationalism and the emergence of the concept of ethnic space in the valley since the late 19th century played its role in redefining the process or meaning of migration for the indigenous people of the valley. Thirdly, migration of the peasants from eastern Bengal was a planned (colonial) state intervention with the objective of surplus accumulation from land use, much unlike the pre-colonial migrations which were not orchestrated by the state systems of the valley. And fourthly, pre-colonial migrations of a community were time bound, whereas the migration of peasants from eastern Bengal since the late 19th century has been a continuous phenomenon, made possible and perpetual by the system of frontier governance, of which the valley has formed an integral part since the colonial period.7 Therefore, it is this historical context of the late 19th and 20th centuries that transformed the migrant peasants from eastern Bengal into political and economic foes of the indigenous people. The migrants emerged in this capacity in the very first decade of the 20th century. The Line System (1920)8 can be taken as an example of this very polarized relation between the indigenous9 and the migrants. And it is remarkable that it has continued to remain so for nearly 100 years now.

(d) Lastly, throughout the colonial and post colonial period, one of the distinct processes of the valley was/has been the peculiar failure of class formation vis-à-vis that of ethnic and ethnic space formation. Since the 19th century, there were two notable processes of class formation in the valley. They were (i) middle class, and (ii) working class in the tea plantations. Nevertheless, the formation of the middle class was not inclusive, i.e. it did not include different categories of ‘ethnic peoples’ that the valley comprised of. Further, even from the early period, the problems in the relation between class and ethnicity within the process of formation of the middle class became evident, for example as in the case of Ahom communitarianism within the middle class. As regards the working class of the tea plantations, it can be said that it constituted the only class that survived as a ‘class’ through much of the 20th century.

Is the Brahmaputra valley perpetually doomed to relations of conflict (thanks to a colonial legacy) thereby legitimizing further the national military policy of the Indian nation state?

However, very significantly, by the last decades of the century, major transformations occurred in both the processes of class formations. Whereas in the case of the middle class, it increasingly broke up and got subsumed into or superceded by that of ethnicity or ethnic space formation, with regard to the working class, it too began to articulate itself more in terms of ethnicity than class by the turn of the century.10 In other words, the fundamental change that occurred was that (i) accumulation of wealth and/or commercial capital took place or began to take place over time along lines of ethnicity rather than class, and (ii) at the same time, protests against exclusion from the process or against the system, i.e. working class politics transformed as well into articulation along lines of ethnicity. The significance of the phenomenon or of the transformation was that it firmly established ethnic space as the principle of socio-cultural, economic and political relation among the various units of ‘people’ that inhabited the valley. It is noted elsewhere that this principle of social organization is inherently conflictual in nature because the match of ethnicity and ethnic space in the valley would only materialize through socio-spatial re-engineering of society, a re-engineering impossible due to the finite nature of the space/land use available/possible in the valley.11 Yet, the systematization of the principle of ethnic space in the valley over the span of nearly a century and a half makes it a systemic continuum or of a self perpetuating nature. It is also notable that conflicts emerging thereof are decidedly sought to be addressed through the national military policy of the Indian nation state. It, in turn, also provides perpetuity to the national military policy in the valley (it generally applies to the entire north east frontier of India).

The above discussion, therefore, highlights two major issues with regard to migration and the Brahmaputra valley, viz. (i) the migration of peasants from the floodplains of eastern Bengal/Bangladesh constitutes a markedly different phenomenon from pre-colonial forms of migration to the valley, and (ii) it constitutes one of the fundamental contributory factors, among others, in relations of violence exploding among the various units of ‘people’ inhabiting the valley. Therefore, this phenomenon of migration which is continuous, of peasants, who remain(ed) peasants in a given context of erosion in the availability of land and of systemic legitimizing of the principle of ethnic space could not, whether for the colonial or the post colonial period, be comprehended in terms of increase and decrease in the total production (whether or not total consumption) capacity. It can only be understood in terms of the larger political economy that it constituted and perpetuates along with other factors.

It is important to take note of two issues in this regard. (a) Firstly, in terms of the expansion of the total production capacity of the economy, whether in the agrarian sector or in the massive informal urban economy of the valley (such as construction, petty trading, etc.), the migrants have historically played a crucial role in its expansion. (b) However, similar to the other units of ‘people’ in the valley, the migrants too have emerged as an ethnic group that subsumes the differences of peasants and labourers into itself rather than splitting into any process of class formation among them. In other words, the peasant economy and the informal urban economy of workers became conjoined along lines of ethnicity rather than splitting along lines of class even among the migrants. Also notable here is that the general argument of a close historical nexus between the two economies does not apply in this case because of the several mismatches between the contexts of spaces of origin and the spaces of operation of the migrants. Therefore, the nexus between the two economies in the valley is post facto and not ipso facto. Further, politics has emerged in the above situation as the means towards consolidating this very process of ethnic formation among the migrants.12

In conclusion therefore, and returning to the theme of ‘development’, the case of the Brahmaputra valley highlights the dangers and insufficiencies of the concept of ‘development’ as an explanatory means to understand societal dynamics, including that of migration. The foregoing discussion amply emphasizes that social organization and social relations can be far better explained in terms of political economy. More specifically with regard to migration and the valley, a few hypotheses may be suggested here. (a) Has the concept of indigenous, a colonial invention, finally lived its life in the valley? (b) However, given its systemic institutionalization (and therefore continuum) in the colonial and post colonial period, can there be an alternative to the principle of ethnicity/ethnic space in social organization in the valley? (c) Therefore, is the valley then perpetually doomed to relations of conflict, thereby legitimizing further the national military policy of the Indian nation state? (d) If the valley is doomed, what would be its implications for the neighbouring hills of the north east frontier of India in the future? (e) and lastly, could it be then that the trite of ‘development’ as the means to resolve conflict is one of the most fantastic farces that has been especially enacted since the 1990s, the Look East Policy being an integral part of it?

Manjeet Barua is on the staff of the School of Translation Studies and Training,
Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi